



















and ‘Centripetal’ Forces at Work
José Gabriel Palma
Abstract
Th   is paper reassesses national income inequalities in this era of globalization. Th   e main conclusion 
is that two opposite forces are at work: one ‘centrifugal’ at the two extremes of the distribution—in-
creasing the disparity of income shares appropriated by the top and by the bottom four deciles across 
countries; and the other ‘centripetal’ in the middle—increasing the uniformity of the share of income 
going to deciles 5 to 9. Th   erefore, globalization is creating a situation where virtually all the inter-
country diversity of income distribution is the result of diﬀ  erences in what the rich and the poor get 
in each country.
JEL classiﬁ  cation: D63 (Equity, Justice, Inequality, and Other Normative Criteria and 
Measurement); F (International Economics); J3 (Wages, Compensation, and Labour Costs); 
O1 (Economic Development).
Keywords: inequality, economic reform, poverty, globalization, incentives.
José Gabriel Palma is Senior Lecturer at the Faculty of Economics, Cambridge University. 
E-mail: jgp5@econ.cam.ac.uk. He is also Joint Editor of the Cambridge Journal of Economics and 
member of Joseph Stiglitz’ Initiative for Policy Dialogue, Columbia University. His main research 
interests are in the econ  omic, historical, institutional and political development of Latin America 
and East Asia, and in the history of ideas on Development Economics and Politics.
Comments should be addressed by email to the author.UN/DESA Working Papers are preliminary 
documents circulated in a limited number of 
copies and posted on the DESA website at 
http://www.un.org/esa/desa/papers to stimulate 
discussion and critical comment.  Th  e  views 
and opinions expressed herein are those of the 
author and do not necessarily reﬂ  ect those of the 
United Nations Secretariat.  Th  e  designations 
and terminology employed may not conform to 
United Nations practice and do not imply the 
expression of any opinion whatsoever on the part 
of the Organization.
Copy editor: Tanima Bossart
Typesetter: Valerian Monteiro
United Nations 
Department of Economic and Social Aﬀ  airs
2 United Nations Plaza, Room DC2-1428
New York, N.Y. 10017, USA




Inequality ranking ........................................................................................................................... 2
Income inequality and income per capita ........................................................................................ 7
Testing for regional eﬀ  ects in a cross-section framework ..................................................................  12
Th   e Mexican experience .................................................................................................................. 14
Conclusions .................................................................................................................................... 18
References ....................................................................................................................................... 20
Appendices ...................................................................................................................................... 22Globalizing Inequality: ‘Centrifugal’ and ‘Centripetal’ Forces at Work 
José Gabriel Palma1
“For unto every one that hath shall be given,
and he shall have abundance; 
but from him that hath not shall be taken away,
even that which he hath.”
    Matthew  25:29
One of the main stylized facts of the era of globalization is that a remarkable increase in the levels of inter-
national trade has been associated in most countries with a signiﬁ  cant deterioration of income distribution. 
Th   is trend towards greater inequality at a time of a generalized increase in trade is far from the predictions 
of Samuelson’s 1950s trade-related factor-price-equalization theorem. For him, an increase in trade would 
improve both the national and international distributions of income. Th   is should happen because export 
expansion would increase the relative income of the (cheap) abundant factor and reduce that of the (expen-
sive) scarce factor in each country. In fact, of all Samuelson’s economic hypotheses, there is probably none that 
inﬂ  uences the United States of America’s foreign policy today as much as the one that postulates that increased 
trade between two countries should reduce the incentive for labour to move across frontiers. In the case of the 
US relationship with Mexico, for example, following the 1982 ‘debt crisis’, the US—always frightened that 
worsening economic problems in Mexico could turn the ﬂ  ow of Mexican immigrants into a tidal wave—gave 
Mexican exports increasingly preferential access to its market, a process that led to the creation of the North 
American Free Trade Agreement (NAFTA).2
Th   erefore, the issues addressed by Samuelson as far back as the 1950s are still some of the most con-
tested hypotheses in the debate on the eﬀ  ects that the globalization-induced increase in trade would have on 
national and international factor movements and income distribution.3 As is well known, one major problem 
with this (or any other) debate on income distribution has been the diﬃ   culty of testing alternative hypotheses, 
especially time series formulations, due to the low quality of available income distribution data. However, 
household survey data have recently substantially improved allowing at least some robust testing of cross-sec-
tional hypotheses. At the same time, some institutions—like the Organization for Economic Cooperation 
and Development (OECD) and the World Bank (WB)—have made sustained eﬀ  orts to collect and process 
these surveys.4 Th   e relevant WB publication, for example, now provides a relatively homogeneous set of data 
1 Th   is paper draws heavily on Palma (2002b; 2003). Tony Atkinson, Stephany Blankenburg, Rodrigo Caputo, Jayati 
Ghosh, Andrew Glyn, Daniel Hahn, Jomo KS, Richard Kozul-Wright, Ugo Pagano, Guillermo Paraje, Hashem 
Pesaran, Guy Standing, Fiona Tregenna, and especially Bob Sutcliﬀ  e made very useful suggestions. Participants at 
conferences and seminars in Bangkok, Chennai, Geneva, Kuala Lumpur, Santiago, Siena and Sydney also made helpful 
comments. Th   e usual caveats apply.
2  At the time of the creation of NAFTA, there were already well over 10 million Mexicans living in the US.
3  For a comprehensive analysis of this literature, see Kanbur (2000). See also Sutcliﬀ  e (2004), Atkinson (1997), Aghion, 
Caroli and Garcia-Peñaloza (1999), IADB (1999) and UNCTAD (1996, 2002).
4  For the OECD’s Luxembourg Income Study (LIS), see http://www.lis.ceps.lu. Th   e World Bank’s basic income distribu-
tion information is published regularly in its World Development Indicators (WDI). See also WIDER (2000).2  DESA Working Paper No. 35
on personal income distribution for 112 countries (World Bank, WDI, 2004). However, there are still some 
signiﬁ  cant problems with the World Development Indicators data set. For example, although most data refer 
to income distribution, some still refer to consumption expenditure (particularly in Sub-Saharan Africa). Th  is 
mix of data makes regional comparison more diﬃ   cult, as the distribution of consumption tends to be more 
equal than the distribution of income (usually by a diﬀ  erence of about 3 percentage points on the Gini scale). 
Th   e accuracy of these surveys is also still a problem.5
Another problem is that, rather surprisingly, the WDI data set still reports income (or consumption) 
distribution only in terms of quintiles; for deciles, it only reports the shares of deciles 1 and 10. Although this 
is a marked improvement over the WB’s earlier Deininger and Squire (D/S) data set (Deininger and Squire, 
1996)—which does not report data for a single income decile—it is clearly unsatisfactory. As will be discussed 
in detail below, crucial distributional information is lost when data are aggregated in quintiles (particularly in 
the top one). Meanwhile, the Research Department of the Inter-American Development Bank (IADB) has 
constructed a slightly more up-to-date income distribution data set for several Latin American countries; it 
uses the same methodology (primary household survey data) and data aggregation (quintiles and deciles 1 and 
10) as the WDI (Székely and Hilgert, 1999b). 
Th   e main aim of this paper is to use these new WB and IADB data sets to take another look at 
national income inequalities in this era of globalization. Th   roughout this paper, unless otherwise stated, the 
IADB data set will be used for Latin America, and the WDI for the rest of the world. Th   e total number of 
countries included in this study is 109.6
Inequality ranking
Figure 1 illustrates how these 109 countries are ranked according to their Gini indices of inequality in the 
second half of the 1990s. Of the many issues emerging from this graph, two stand out. First, in the second 
half of the 1990s, there was a particularly wide range of inequality across countries—from a very low Gini 
index of 19.5 per cent (Slovak Republic) to a high of 62.3 per cent (Paraguay). Second, all Latin American 
countries were clearly grouped at the very top end of the inequality ranking—with a median Gini of 56.7 per 
cent and mean of 54.7 per cent. Th   e degree of inequality in Latin America was well over half as much again 
as the median value for the rest of the sample (92 countries), and more than 40 per cent higher than that for 
the ‘non-Latin American’ developing countries (51 countries, excluding OECD and transition economies). In 
addition, among the 109 countries studied, the median country-inequality ranking for the 17 Latin American 
countries was 100 (see also UNCTAD, 1996).
Th   ere also seemed to be an extraordinary diﬀ  erence between English-speaking and non-English-
speaking OECD countries, with the latter including continental Europe and Japan—with median Ginis of 
36.0 and 27.1, respectively. Th   e same contrast was found between the ex-communist countries of the former 
Soviet Union and those of Central Europe—with median Ginis of 34.4 and 27.5, respectively. 
5  The Sierra Leone survey, for example, undertaken in the midst of a rather brutal civil war, claims to have ‘na-
tional’ coverage! In the case of Latin America, a critical review of the quality of household surveys can be found 
in Székely and Hilgert (1999a).
6  Following advice from WB staff, data from Sierra Leone and the Central African Republic are excluded from the 
sample due to inconsistencies.Globalizing Inequality: ‘Centrifugal’ and ‘Centripetal’ Forces at Work  3
Figure 2 shows an equally important but surprisingly less well-known fact—the contrasting shares of 
deciles 9 and 10.7 While the range for the income share of decile 9 in these 109 countries only extends across 
5.6 percentage points (from 12.6 per cent in India to 18.8 per cent in South Africa), decile 10 has a range 
six times larger (from 18.2 per cent in the Slovak Republic to 50.8 per cent in Paraguay). Th  is  extraordinary 
diﬀ  erence between the dispersion of these two deciles is reﬂ  ected in their standard deviations—while that 
of decile 9 is just 0.9 percentage points (around a mean of 15.2 per cent), that of decile 10 is 8.1 percentage 
points (with a mean of 31.4 per cent); hence, relative to their own means, the standard deviation of decile 10 
is more than four times larger than that of decile 9. 
Th   is phenomenon is also corroborated by the fact that while the median values for the share of decile 
9 in the Latin American and non-Latin American groups are quite similar (15.9 per cent and 15.4 per cent, 
7 Th   is is just one of the many instances of loss of information when data is only available in terms of 
quintiles.
Figure 1:
Most recent data on Gini indices of 
personal income distribution of 109 countries
Inequality ranking





























Source: World Bank, WDI, 2004.
Notes: Countries are ranked according to 
their degree of inequality (1 to 109); Latin 
American countries are shown in black (this 
will also be the case in similar graphs below). 
Th   roughout this paper, Gini indices are 
reported on a scale from 1 to 100.
Br = Brazil; Ch = Chile; Me = Mexico; 
SA = South Africa; Ni = Nigeria; 
Ma = Malaysia; Ke = Kenya; US = United 
States; Cn = China; In = India; UK = United 
Kingdom; Ba = Bangladesh; Po = Poland; Ko 
= Republic of Korea; It = Italy; 
Sw = Sweden; and SR = Slovak Republic.
Figure 2:
Most recent data on income share 
of deciles 9 and 10 in 109 countries
Inequality ranking




















Source: World Bank, WDI, 2004.
Notes: Each ranking is made independently 
from the other. Unless otherwise stated, this 
will be the case for all similar graphs in this 
paper. 
In this and other graphs below, the data for 
Brazil, Chile and Mexico will be highlighted, 
as these are the three Latin American countries 
that have the worst income distribution in 
terms of the relationship between income 
distribution and income per capita (see ﬁ  gure 
16 below). Data for the Republic of Korea are 
shown for comparison. 
Br = Brazil; Ch = Chile; Ko = Republic of 
Korea; Me = Mexico.4  DESA Working Paper No. 35
respectively), those for decile 10 are very diﬀ  erent, with the Latin American share more than half as much 
again as the median value for the rest of the sample (44.1 per cent and 28.4 per cent, respectively). In other 
words, one of the key elements (if not the key one) needed to understand the eﬀ  ects of globalization on na-
tional income distribution is the impact it has on the share of decile 10.8
Figures 3 and 4 indicate that the key characteristic of the income distribution of most Latin Ameri-
can countries is its shift towards a ‘winner takes all’ pattern. In the case of Chile, for example, ﬁ  gure 2 already 
indicated that its decile 10 is ranked as the 104th most unequal among the 109 countries, while its decile 9 is 
8  In fact, as discussed elsewhere, decile 10 also tended to have signiﬁ  cant internal dispersion; and the real concentration 
of income is found within the ﬁ  rst 5 percentiles of income recipients (see Palma, 2002a). Th   is point is also clear from 
some country studies; see, for example, Ferreira and Litchﬁ  eld (2000) for Brazil, Panuco (1988) for Mexico, and Paraje 
(2004) for Argentina. Consequently, one should focus on the eﬀ  ects of globalization on the income share of the top 5 
per cent of the population; however, this is not possible with the available data.
Figure 3:
Chile: Income shares of deciles 9 and 10, 1957-1999
Decile 9 Decile 10






























Source: Ruiz-Tagle (2000). Unless otherwise 
stated, this will be the source of all historical 
data for Chile.
Notes: Th   ree-year moving averages. 
[1] = election of President Allende; [2] = 
Augusto Pinochet’s coup d’état; [3] = the year 
before President Pinochet’s plebiscite (seeking 
a mandate to remain in power for another 
8 years); [4] = ﬁ  rst democratic government 
(centre-left coalition) after President Pinochet 
lost his plebiscite (and had to call for 
presidential elections); 
[5] = second democratic government (same 
political coalition, but a return to ‘market-led’ 
distributed policies). 
Chile is only one of a few developing 
countries for which there are relatively 
systematic income distribution data for a good 
length of time. See Ruiz-Tagle (2000) for a 
detailed discussion of the quality of the data 
(relating to ‘Greater Santiago’, all of which 
have the same source and methodology), and 
of the work by this author to improve their 
consistency.
Source: Constructed by author using data from 
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only ranked 38th (its ranking is even better than South Korea’s!). In turn, ﬁ  gures 3 and 4 illustrate the already-
mentioned shift in its pattern of distribution towards a ‘winner takes all’ scenario: after the 1973 coup d’état 
(which also marked the beginning of trade liberalization and the rapid integration of Chile into the world 
economy), when income distribution had one of the fastest deteriorations ever recorded, only decile 10 ben-
eﬁ  ted from it. 
While the income share of decile 10 increased by nearly 50 per cent between 1972 and 1987 (from 
34 per cent of national income to no less than 51 per cent), even that of decile 9 lost some relative ground.9 
As a result of this increasing polarization, one way to highlight the extreme inequality found in Latin America 
is to look at the ratio of the income shares of deciles 10 and 1.10
Figure 5 shows that there is a signiﬁ  cant diﬀ  erence even between the ratios of deciles 10 to 1 and that 
of deciles 9 to 2. However, the huge diﬀ  erence is principally due to the last third of the sample—mainly com-
prising Latin American and Sub-Saharan African countries. Th   e resulting ranges for both rankings are very 
diﬀ  erent: while the ratio of deciles 10 to 1 ranges from 3.6 to 114, that of deciles 9 to 2 only extends from 1.9 
to 10.9.11
Of the more straightforward statistics for measuring inequality, this probably best reﬂ  ects the degree of 
income inequality found in Latin America, and the extraordinary degree of income polarization in the region. 
At a median value of 58.1, the Latin American ratio is 4.7 times the median value for the 51 non-Latin Ameri-
  9  Moreover, later on, when the second democratic Government in Chile (1994-1999) abandoned the progressive dis-
tributive policies of the ﬁ  rst, and the income share of decile 10 recovered all the ground lost since 1989 (6 percentage 
points of national income), the share of decile 9 again dropped.
10 Th   e broad range of income shares of decile 1 across countries is almost as remarkable as that found in decile 10—from 
5.1 per cent in Belarus and the Slovak Republic (and 4.8 per cent in Japan), to just 0.5 per cent in Guinea-Bissau (and 
0.6 per cent in Guatemala, and 0.7 per cent in Paraguay). Again, Latin American countries were at the unequal end of 
the ranking; while the median value of the income shares of decile 1 for all countries was 2.6 per cent, that for Latin 
America was just 0.8 per cent (only about a third that for the non-Latin American countries).
11 Th   e range for the ratio of deciles 10 and 1 extends from 3.6 in the Slovak Republic (and 3.9 in Belarus, 4.4 in Austria, 
4.5 in Japan and 5.1 in Finland), to no less than 114 in Bolivia (and 112 in Honduras and 104 in El Salvador).
Figure 5:
Ratio of income shares of deciles 10 to 1, and 9 to 2 in 109 countries
Inequality ranking
















 Ch  10/1
9/2
Sources: World Bank, WDI, 2004 and Székely 
and Hilgert, 1999b.
Note: Br = Brazil; Ch = Chile; Ko = Republic 
of Korea; Me = Mexico.6  DESA Working Paper No. 35
can developing countries, and more than 6 times the median value for the 92 non-Latin American countries 
in the sample (9.6). Th   e statistics also diﬀ  erentiate most Latin American inequality from that of Sub-Saharan 
Africa (the latter’s median value, at 19.3, is only one-third that for Latin America). 
Latin America’s greater inequality, vis-à-vis other regions of the world, decreases rapidly for income 
groups closer to the middle of the distribution, i.e., between deciles 8 and 3. Yet, many theories purporting 
to explain Latin America’s greater inequality refer to phenomena in the middle of the distribution, e.g., the 
import-substituting, industrialization-related ‘labour aristocracy’ hypothesis of the 1960s, and the trade liber-
alization-related ‘asymmetric demand for labour’ proposition of the 1990s.
Th  e  ﬁ  rst hypothesis, widely invoked during the 1960s and 1970s, particularly by those connected 
with the World Bank, argued that one of the main causes of inequality in Latin America during that period 
was the price distortions associated with import-substituting industrialization (ISI). Th   ese distorted the values 
of sectoral marginal productivities, causing artiﬁ  cially higher real wages in manufacturing, i.e., producing 
higher wage diﬀ  erentials than would otherwise exist in the economy (World Bank, 1987; Krueger, 1983). 
However, there was little then (as now) to diﬀ  erentiate Latin America from the rest of the world—develop-
ing and developed, ISI and non-ISI—in terms of the income distribution among groups that would include 
‘aristocratic’ and non-‘aristocratic’ labour (say, quintiles 4 to 2, or 3 to 2).
Th   e second proposition basically recycled the ‘labour-aristocracy’ hypothesis to explain the increased 
inequality in many Latin American countries following trade and ﬁ  nancial liberalization. Th   is increase in 
inequality, following greater integration into the world economy, contrasts not only with Samuelson’s original 
expectations but also with the predictions of the ‘Washington Consensus’ before the implementation of these 
reforms (Lal, 1983). Hence, it is now argued that this previously unforeseen development took place because 
trade liberalization introduced new production techniques requiring more skilled workers, thus increasing 
Table 1:
Regional median values for different income ratios
d10/d1 d9/d2 q4/q2 q3/q2
Latin America 58.1 7.0 2.7 1.6
Non-Latin American Developing Countries (51) 12.5 3.9 2.0 1.4
Sub-Saharan Africa 19.3 4.8 2.1 1.4
East Asia-2 15.9 5.1 2.3 1.5
Caribbean 13.8 4.3 2.1 1.4
OECD-2 11.8 4.0 2.0 1.4
North Africa 9.6 3.8 2.0 1.4
Ex-communist-2 9.6 3.7 1.9 1.4
South Asia 8.3 3.3 1.8 1.3
Ex-communist-1 8.4 3.3 1.8 1.3
East Asia-1 8.4 3.3 1.8 1.3
OECD-1 6.0 2.7 1.6 1.3
All 11.6 3.9 2.0 1.4
Developing countries 14.2 4.7 2.2 1.5
Sources: World Bank, WDI, 2004 and Székely and Hilgert, 1999b.
Notes: Regions as in appendix 1. d10/d1 = ratio of deciles 10 to 1; d9/d2 = ratio of deciles 9 to 2; q4/q2 = ratio of quintiles 4 to 2; 
and q3/q2 = ratio of quintiles 3 to 2.Globalizing Inequality: ‘Centrifugal’ and ‘Centripetal’ Forces at Work  7
wage diﬀ  erentials.12 However, as is obvious from the previous graphs and Table 1, Latin American income 
inequality has been distinguished at the poles of the income distribution—hardly where either skilled or un-
skilled members of the formal labour force are located. Th   erefore, even if trade liberalization introduced new 
production techniques with ‘asymmetrical labour demand’, it is unlikely that this would account for much of 
the region’s increased income inequality; the case of Chile provides a good example of this.
Even though Chile implemented one of the most radical trade liberalization policies in the developing 
world, and in spite of the fact that this policy has now been in place for more than three decades, it seems to 
have had little eﬀ  ect on the relative income distribution between skilled and unskilled members of the formal 
labour force (proxied in ﬁ  gure 6 by the ratio of deciles 9 to 2 and 5 to 3). Th   is graph suggests that massive 
political upheavals, radical economic reforms and greater integration into the world economy have had signiﬁ  -
cant eﬀ  ects at the extreme ends of the income distribution, but little eﬀ  ect in between. 
Th   e Chilean experience also indicates that ‘policy matters’. Income distribution did improve signiﬁ  -
cantly with the progressive distribution policies of the ﬁ  rst post-Pinochet democratic government (1989-
1993), even though it continued the process of greater integration into the world economy. However, when 
the second democratic government (1993-1999), formed by the same political coalition, abandoned progres-
sive distributional policies for more ‘market-oriented’ ones, the ratio of deciles 10 to 1 returned to what it had 
been when President Pinochet left in 1989. 
Income inequality and income per capita
Th   e most common way of comparing income distribution across countries has been in relation to the income 
per capita level. Th   is approach was pioneered by Kuznets (1955) and has dominated distributional debates 
12  See, for example, Juhn and Pierce (1993); Revenga (1995); Cline (1997; this book has a very useful survey of the 
literature); Haskel (1999); and Melendez (2001). For critiques of this literature, see Krugman and Lawrence (1993), 
Robbins (1996) and Atkinson (1997).
Figure 6:
Chile: ratio of income shares of 
deciles 10 to 1, 9 to 2, and 5 to 3, 1957-1999


















Notes: Th   ree-year moving averages. 
[1] = election of President Allende; 
[2] = Augusto Pinochet’s coup d’état; 
[3] = the year before President Pinochet’s 
plebiscite (seeking a mandate to remain 
in power for another 8 years); [4] = ﬁ  rst 
democratic government (centre-left coalition) 
after President Pinochet lost his plebiscite (and 
had to call for proper presidential elections); 
[5] = second democratic government (same 
political coalition).8  DESA Working Paper No. 35
ever since. Figure 7 shows the regional averages for the whole sample.13 Th   e graph suggests four ‘layers’ of 
inequality across countries. First, a more equal layer containing the ex-communist countries of Central Europe 
and the non-Anglophone OECD; a second layer containing a great variety of regions, with more than three-
quarters of the world’s population; a third one including only Sub-Saharan Africa and the ‘second-tier’ newly 
industrialized countries (NICs) (East Asia ‘2’); and fourth, Latin America, with inequality well above every 
other region in the world, including those with similar income per capita, such as North Africa, East Asia ‘2’ 
and the Caribbean.
However, as discussed above, it is also important to look ‘inside’ the Gini ratio. As might have been 
expected, ﬁ  gure 8 shows a particularly close correlation between regional Ginis and the income shares of decile 
10. Of course, this strong correlation is the result of the way the Gini index is calculated.
13  In this section, data from Hong Kong SAR and Taiwan Province of China are added to that for South Korea to form 
an enlarged EA1. Th   e data for these countries, not available in the WDI database, were obtained from Deininger and 
Squire (1996). However, these two countries are not included in the regressions of the fourth section, as the data there 
are from a diﬀ  erent source.
Figure 7:
Regional Gini indices and log of income per capita
















 OECD 1 
 OECD 2 
 Ex-c 1 
 Ex-c 2 
Sources: World Bank, WBI, 2004. Income 
distribution as above; income per capita 
according to the World Bank’s WDI data set 
(data are for 1997, in 1995 US$ terms). Th  is 
will also be the case for the remaining graphs 
in this paper.
Notes: Regional ﬁ  gures are median values. LA 
= Latin America; AF = Sub-Saharan Africa; 
EA1 = ‘ﬁ  rst-tier’ NICs; EA2 = ‘second-tier’ 
NICs; SA = large South Asia and low-income 
Southeast Asia; NA = North Africa; CA = 
Caribbean countries; OECD 1 = non-English-
speaking OECD; OECD 2 = English-
speaking OECD; Ex-c 1 = ex-communist 
countries of Central Europe; Ex-c 2 = 
ex-communist countries of the former Soviet 
Union. For countries within each region, see 
appendix 1.
Figure 8:
Regional income shares of decile 10 and log of income per capita
Log of income per capita in 1997 (in 1995 US$)















 OECD 1 
 OECD 2   CA 
 Ex-c 1 
Ex-c 2 
Source: World Bank, WDI, 2004.
Notes: Regional ﬁ  gures are median values. 
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Figure 9 shows the regional distribution pattern for deciles 1 to 4 mirroring that for decile 10. Th  ere-
fore, the Ginis for regional inequality are reﬂ  ected both at the very top and at the bottom of the distribution 
of income for the regions. However, when one looks in ﬁ  gure 10 at the remaining 50 per cent of the popula-
tion—the ‘middle classes’ (sometimes also called the ‘administrative classes’ in institutional economics) located 
between deciles 5 to 9—the regional distributional picture changes from one of huge variation to remarkable 
similarity. Th   is similarity is even more surprising for the ‘upper middle’ 30 per cent of the population (deciles 
7, 8 and 9), as shown in ﬁ  gure 11.
Table 2 presents statistics for the whole sample, emphasizing the remarkable contrast between the 
distributional heterogeneity at the top and bottom of the income distribution and the homogeneity in the 
middle. Of all the statistics in table 2, the coeﬃ   cient of variation best shows this distributional contrast—the 
ﬁ  gures for both decile 10 and deciles 1 to 4 are nearly four times greater than those for deciles 5 to 9. Fur-
Figure 9:
Regional income shares of decile 1 to 4 and log of income per capita
Log of income per capita in 1997 (in 1995 US$)
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Figure 10:
Regional income shares of deciles 5 to 9 and log of income per capita
Log of income per capita in 1997 (in 1995 US$)
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Source: World Bank, WDI, 2004.
Notes: Regional ﬁ  gures are median values. 
Regions as in ﬁ  gure 7 and appendix 1.
Source: World Bank, WDI, 2004.
Notes: Regional ﬁ  gures are median values. 
Regions as in ﬁ  gure 7 and appendix 1.10  DESA Working Paper No. 35
thermore, they are nearly seven times larger than for deciles 7 to 9. Th   e 50 per cent of the population located 
between deciles 5 to 9 seems to be able to count on about half the national income. Th   is suggests that ‘middle 
classes’ across the world, particularly the ‘upper middle classes’, seem to be able to beneﬁ  t from a distributional 
‘safety net’, i.e., regardless of the per capita income level of the country, the characteristics of the political re-
gimes, the economic policies implemented, the structure of property rights, or whether or not they belong to 
countries that managed to get their prices ‘right’, their institutions ‘right’ or their social capital ‘right’. In other 
words, regardless of the political institutional settlement, they are able to acquire a ‘property right’ on half the 
national income. 
Th   e bottom 40 per cent of the population has no such luck. For them, such policy and institutional 
variations make the diﬀ  erence between getting as much as one-quarter of national income (as in the non-Eng-
lish speaking OECD or the ex-communist countries of Central Europe), or as little as 10 per cent (as in Latin 
America). As far as the top income decile is concerned, the sky is (almost) the limit. 
In other words, the regional distributional pattern suggested by the Gini index only reﬂ  ects the 
income disparities of half the world’s population, i.e., those at the very top and at the bottom of the distribu-
tion, and does not reﬂ  ect the distributional homogeneity of the other half. Th   is is a rather important phe-
nomenon from a statistical point of view, raising serious questions about the usefulness of the Gini index as 
Figure 11:
Regional income shares of deciles 7 to 9 and log of income per capita
Log of income per capita in 1997 (in 1995 US$)
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Table 2:
Measures of centrality and spread for income groups
(whole sample)
range median mean variance st dev c of var
d10 32.6 29.4 31.4 64.8 8.1 26
d1-d4 19.8 18.0 17.4 21.9 4.7 27
d5-d9 15.4 51.7 52.4 11.4 3.9 7
d7-d9 9.7 36.8 36.6 2.7 1.7 4
Source: World Bank, WDI, 2004.
Notes: st dev = standard deviation; c of var = coeﬃ   cient of variation (ﬁ  gures shown are multiplied by 100); d10 = decile 10; d1–d4 = 
deciles 1 to 4; d5-d9 = deciles 5 to 9; and d7-d9 = deciles 7 to 9.
Source: World Bank, WDI, 2004.
Notes: Regional ﬁ  gures are median values. 
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an indicator of overall income inequality. Analytically, economic reforms, trade and ﬁ  nancial liberalization, 
globalization, changing property rights, as well as other recent economic and political developments, seem 
to have been associated with two very diﬀ  erent distributional dynamics across regions in the world: a (better 
known) ‘centrifugal’ one in the income shares of the top and bottom deciles (decile 10 and deciles 1 to 4), and 
a (lesser known) ‘centripetal’ movement in the income shares of deciles 5 to 9. 
Regional distributional homogeneity in the middle (especially upper-middle) of the distribution casts 
doubts on the ‘human capital’ theory of income distribution. According to this theory, the level of education 
is a crucial—if not the most crucial—variable in the determination of income inequality (Neal and Rosen, 
2000). However, in all regions of the world (developed and developing, Latin American and non-Latin Ameri-
can), the top income decile is made up of individuals with relatively advanced levels of education, while those 
in the bottom four deciles have relatively low levels of formal education—either relatively little schooling, or 
(in the more advanced countries), schooling of rather doubtful quality. So why do these two relatively homo-
geneously educated groups have such great distributional diversity? In turn, if signiﬁ  cant educational diversity 
is found among the population in deciles 5 to 9—e.g., in terms of the share of the population with secondary 
and (especially) tertiary education—why does one ﬁ  nd such extraordinary similarity in the shares of national 
income of this educationally highly heterogeneous group?
Obviously, more research needs to be done on the forces shaping the national income shares of 
diﬀ  erent deciles along such diﬀ  erent paths (particularly in such opposite ‘centrifugal’ and ‘centripetal’ direc-
tions). Remarkably, this simple observation does not seem to have been emphasized before. Also, it seems odd 
that much of the recent literature on income ‘polarization’ has produced indices to emphasize distributional 
changes around the middle of the distribution, where there has, in fact, been far greater distributional homo-
geneity.14 In fact, the higher degree of heterogeneity at the very top and bottom of the income distribution 
makes income ratios, such as those of deciles 10 to 1, highly sensitive statistical indicators of distributional 
disparities across the world, particularly highlighting Latin America’s greater income polarization. From this 
perspective, ﬁ  gure 12 shows that Latin America seems to be living in a distributional world of its own—as if 
on a diﬀ  erent planet!
14  Wolfson (1994), for example, started the recent ‘polarization’ literature by developing an index that cuts the Lorenz 
curve right in the middle! For a discussion of this point, see Palma (2002b).
Figure 12:
Regional ratios of deciles 10 to 1 and log of income per capita
Log of income per capita in 1997 (in 1995 US$)
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Sources: World Bank, WDI, 2004 and Székely 
and Hilgert, 1999b.
Notes: Regional ﬁ  gures are harmonic means 
for the ratios of the income share of deciles 
10 to 1, and arithmetic means for the log of 
income per capita. Regions as in ﬁ  gure 7 and 
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Testing for regional eﬀ  ects in a cross-section framework
As is well known, the Kuznets ‘inverted U’ framework is the most commonly used hypothesis for testing the 
relationship between income inequality and income per capita, both in a time series and in a cross-section 
framework. However, in doing so, one has to distinguish crucially between two factors: ﬁ  rst, whether there is 
a statistical relationship of this kind between these two variables, and second, how to interpret this relation-
ship analytically; i.e., if the test shows a signiﬁ  cant relationship of this kind, the Kuznets ‘structural change’ 
hypothesis is just one of several possible interpretations of the nature of this relationship. 
Here, I am going to use the traditional econometric speciﬁ  cation test for regional eﬀ  ects among these 
variables, though evidence of a statistically signiﬁ  cant relationship between them will not be interpreted as 
evidence of a Kuznets-type relationship proper, due to the already extensive and persuasive literature arguing 
against this (Kanbur, 2000). In view of the above ﬁ  nding (of a homogeneous ‘middle’ versus heterogeneous 
‘poles’), I shall not test this relationship using the Gini ‘average’ as a dependent inequality variable, as this sta-
tistic aggregates two very diﬀ  erent distributional worlds. Th   erefore, the ‘inverted U’ hypothesis will be tested 
using the income shares of diﬀ  erent income groups as dependent variables, with the right-hand side variables 
being an intercept, the log of income per capita, and the square of the same variable. Also, as discussed in 
detail elsewhere (Palma, 2002c), for statistical and analytical reasons, one should not yet include the ex-com-
munist countries of Central Europe and the former Soviet Union in the sample to be tested for regional 
distributional eﬀ  ects. Hence, the sample used only contains 90 countries. Figure 13 shows the results of such a 
test for the income shares of the top decile.15
Figure 13 indicates that there are no less than ﬁ  ve statistically signiﬁ  cant regional dummies—one 
dummy, Latin America, is signiﬁ  cant at the 1 per cent level, and the other four at the 5 per cent level; all other 
parameters and the F test are signiﬁ  cant at the 1 per cent level. Th   e adjusted R2 is 74 per cent. In fact, the only 
regions where the dummies were not signiﬁ  cant at the 5 per cent level were East Asia, the Caribbean and the 
English-speaking OECD (14 countries in all); therefore, these countries are included in the base regression 
together with the eight countries not classiﬁ  ed in any of these regions (see appendix 1).
Figure 14 shows again the converse relationship between the share of the top decile and that of the 
bottom four deciles. Th   is regression is also highly signiﬁ  cant, with all eight parameters (including all ﬁ  ve dum-
mies) and the F test signiﬁ  cant at the 1 per cent level. Th  e  R2 is 64 per cent. 
However, not surprisingly, the regionally homogeneous ‘middle’ (deciles 5 to 9) shows no 
signiﬁ  cant regional eﬀ  ects for this half of the population. Finally, strong regional eﬀ  ects are again found 
when an ‘inverted U’ speciﬁ  cation is tested with the ratio of deciles 10 to 1 as the dependent variable, as in 
ﬁ  gure 15.
15  For a discussion of the econometric issues raised by cross-section regressions like these, see Pesaran, Haque and Sharma 
(2000); see also Palma (2002c). In particular, one has to understand that these regressions are simply a cross-sectional 
description of cross-country inequality diﬀ  erences, categorized by income per capita; i.e., they should not be interpreted 
as ‘predictive’, because there are a number of diﬃ   culties with a curve estimated from a single cross-section—especially 
regarding the homogeneity restrictions that are required to hold. Th   is is one reason why the use of regional dummies 
is so important, because they bring us closer to the required homogeneity restrictions for prediction. Nevertheless, 
there is no obvious way of knowing if we are close enough to be able to predict with reasonable conﬁ  dence. Th  e  jury 
is, therefore, still out regarding the predictive capacity of such regressions. Moreover, in any classiﬁ  cation of this type, 
there is a ‘pre-testing’ danger, as there are many ways to deﬁ  ne regions.Globalizing Inequality: ‘Centrifugal’ and ‘Centripetal’ Forces at Work  13
Figure 13:
Income shares of decile 10 and log of income per capita
Log of income per capita in 1997 (in 1995 US$)
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Source: World Bank, WDI, 2004.
Notes: 1 = the regression with an intercept-
dummy for Latin America; 2 = with an 
intercept-dummy for Sub-Saharan Africa; 3 
= base regression; 4 = with a dummy in the 
square of income per capita variable for the 
non-English-speaking OECD; 5 = with a 
dummy on the income per capita variable for 
South Asia and low-income South-east Asia; 
and 6 = with an intercept-dummy for North 
Africa.
Dummies for each region were selected 
according to the Akaike Information 
Criterion. Th   e same dummies were used in 
the regressions below.
For the summary statistics of the regressions, 
see appendix 2. 
Regional ﬁ  gures are median values. Regions as 
in ﬁ  gure 7 and appendix 1.
Figure 14:
Income shares of deciles 1 to 4 and log of income per capita
Log of income per capita in 1997 (in 1995 US$)
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Source: World Bank, WDI, 2004.
Notes: 1 = the regression with a dummy for 
North Africa; 2 = with a dummy for South 
Asia and low-income South-east Asia; 3 = 
with a dummy for the non-English-speaking 
OECD; 4 = base regression; 5 = with a 
dummy for Sub-Saharan Africa; and 6 = with 
a dummy for Latin America. 
For the summary statistics of the regressions, 
see appendix 2. 
Regional ﬁ  gures are median values. Regions as 
in ﬁ  gure 7 and appendix 1.
Figure 15:
Income ratios of deciles 10 to 1 and log of income per capita
Log of income per capita in 1997 (in 1995 US$)























Sources: World Bank, WDI, 2004 and Székely 
and Hilgert, 1999b.
Notes: 1 = the regression with a dummy 
for Latin America; 2 = with a dummy for 
Sub-Saharan Africa; 3 = base regression; 4 = 
with a dummy for the non-English-speaking 
OECD; 5 = with a dummy for South Asia and 
low-income South-east Asia; and 6 = with a 
dummy for North Africa.
For the summary statistics of the regressions, 
see appendix 2. 
Regional averages in this graph are geometric 
means for the ratios of the income shares of 
deciles 10 to 1, and arithmetic means for the 
log of income per capita. Regions as in ﬁ  gure 
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Again, this regression is highly signiﬁ  cant; four of the dummies are signiﬁ  cant at a 1 per cent level, 
and all other parameters (except for the intercept) are signiﬁ  cant at 5 per cent. Th  e  R2 is 71 per cent. Th  is  is 
the speciﬁ  cation of the regional distributional eﬀ  ects, in which the ‘excess’ degree of Latin American inequality 
is shown in more extreme form. In general, the Latin American intercept dummies are signiﬁ  cant at the 1 per 
cent level in all three speciﬁ  cations of the dependent variable (decile 10, deciles 1 to 4, and the ratio of deciles 
10 to 1). Th   ere seems to be particularly strong statistical evidence that towards the end of the 1990s, Latin 
American countries developed a higher degree of inequality vis-à-vis their middle-income level.16
However, as there is no Latin American country with high income per capita, this sample provides no 
information as to what could happen to this higher inequality as such countries reach higher income lev-
els.17 Furthermore, as ﬁ  gure 16 shows, towards the end of the 1990s, as per capita income increased in Latin 
America, the distributional dispersion among countries in the region also increased rapidly. 
Th  e  ﬁ  ve countries with the highest per capita incomes in the region—Uruguay, Chile, Brazil, Venezu-
ela and Mexico—have a large range of income shares for decile 10. In fact, the two countries with the highest 
income per capita, Uruguay and Brazil, have the lowest and the second highest income shares for this decile: 
33.1 per cent and 46.5 per cent, respectively. Also, at the end of the 1990s, in Brazil, Chile and Mexico, 
income inequality was actually growing as per capita income increased, moving, therefore, in the opposite 
direction shown by the ‘inverted U’ curve. 
The Mexican experience
A brief analysis of Mexico could help us understand why increased integration into the world economy, after 
economic reform in general and trade and ﬁ  nancial liberalization in particular, has increased the gap between 
16 Th   is statement can be conﬁ  rmed, for example, by testing the Latin American dummy vis-à-vis the Sub-Saharan African 
one; in all four speciﬁ  cations, the null hypothesis that both are not signiﬁ  cantly diﬀ  erent is easily rejected at the 1 per 
cent level.
17  In any case, as discussed above, even if there were such information, in order to be able to use regressions like these for 
prediction purposes, one would require strong ‘homogeneity restrictions’ to hold.
Figure 16:
Latin America (17): income share of 
decile 10 and log of income per capita
Log of income per capita in 1997 (in 1995 US$)




























Source: World Bank, WDI, 2004.
Notes: Ni = Nicaragua; Ho = Honduras; 
Bo = Bolivia; Gu = Guatemala; 
Pr = Paraguay; Ec = Ecuador; 
Sa = El Salvador; Co = Colombia; 
Pa = Panama; Br = Brazil; Ch = Chile; 
DR = Dominican Republic; Pe = Peru; 
Me = Mexico; Ve = Venezuela; 
CR = Costa Rica; and Ur = Uruguay. 
Th   e regression for Latin America is as in ﬁ  gure 
13. For summary statistics of this regression, 
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the top and the bottom of the distribution. Although political reform began in Mexico during the presidency 
of Lopez Portillo (1976-1982), trade liberalization began with President de la Madrid, who took oﬃ   ce in the 
midst of the 1982 debt crisis. Mexico has never looked back in terms of growth of manufacturing exports—in 
constant US dollar terms, manufactured exports (including those from so-called ‘maquila’ enterprises) grew 
from US$8 billion in 1981 to US$150 billion in 2004 (in 2000 US$ values)—a ﬁ  gure similar to South 
Korea’s manufacturing exports. Th   is 19-fold increase (equivalent to an average annual growth rate of 14 per 
cent) increased the share of manufactures in the country’s total goods exports to 80 per cent from less than 10 
per cent in 1981.18
Even though Mexican history shows that proximity to the US is a mixed blessing at best, as far as 
goods exports are concerned, few developing countries have such a geographical advantage, augmented by 
preferential access to the US market (via NAFTA).19 Nevertheless, even considering the help provided by the 
related ﬂ  ood of foreign direct investment (FDI),20 the growth of Mexican manufactured exports in this period 
has been truly exceptional. Yet, this export expansion has had a far more complex, and weaker, impact than 
expected on the Mexican economy as a whole, especially on growth, investment, productivity and wages. In 
particular, it has been associated with both a collapse of the export multiplier and the de-linking of the export 
sector from the rest of the economy; this has produced a situation in which increasing export competitiveness 
has had little eﬀ  ect on growth and living standards.21
Figure 17 shows the trademark of the ‘liberalization package’ in Mexico (as in the rest of Latin 
America): a fall in the share of wages and salaries in gross domestic product (GDP). In Mexico, over just two 
six-year presidential terms (1976-1982, 1982-1988) and one economic crisis, the share of wages and salaries 
in GDP fell by no less than 14 percentage points. In the last presidency of the 1990s (which saw yet another 
18  In 2000, Mexico’s manufacturing exports were 3.5 times greater than those of Argentina and Brazil taken together. In 
terms of overall merchandise exports, Mexico’s share in the Latin American total doubled from just under one-quarter 
to about one-half.
19  As Mexicans like to say, their country is doubly cursed—so far from God, but so close to the US.
20  In US$ of 2000 value, between 1982 and 2000, Mexico received US$200 billion in net inﬂ  ows of FDI (see Palma, 
2005).
21  For a detailed analysis of the Mexican economy after trade liberalization, see Palma (2005).
Figure 17:
Mexico: wages as a share of GDP, 1950-2000









Notes: Wages, salaries and employers’ 
contributions. Intervals between circles 
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economic crisis), the share of wages in GDP fell by a further 8 percentage points. In all, the share of wages fell 
from 40 per cent of GDP in 1976 to just 18.9 per cent in 2000. 
Figure 18 shows the root cause of this fall in the share of wages in GDP: the emergence of a new 
‘scissors’ eﬀ  ect between wages and productivity after political and economic reforms. One can identify three 
distinct periods over the second half of the 20th century. First, up to the Echeverría Government (1970-1976), 
one can see the essential characteristic of the traditional Partido Revolucionario Institucional (PRI) distribu-
tive policy: wages were able to grow at a pace similar to productivity growth, i.e., increased bargaining power 
in a corporatist environment enabled labour to gain the ‘property right’ to share in the beneﬁ  ts of economic 
growth.
In the second period, during Lopez Portillo’s term of oﬃ   ce (between 1976 and 1982), marking the 
beginning of political-ideological change in Mexico, economic policy led to progressive stagnation of wages, 
despite massive new oil riches.22 Th   en, when economic crisis struck Mexico in 1982, and with the ascendance 
to power of President de la Madrid and his economic reform team, a third period started, characterized by a 
rapidly growing gap between productivity and wages. By 2000, two presidents and another economic crisis 
later, this gap had reached approximately 30 percentage points. Figures 19 and 20 show that the gap between 
productivity and wages took a diﬀ  erent form for manufacturing than for non-tradables.
Prior to 1976, there was a relatively stable relationship between productivity growth and wage growth 
in manufacturing; this pattern subsequently changed due to a sharp break in the trend of wage growth. In 
fact, by the end of the 1990s, the average wage was only just recovering to its 1976 level, while productivity 
had increased by about 80 per cent in the meantime—a clear case of a shift towards a new ‘winner takes all’ 
pattern of distribution with greatly increased proﬁ  t margins.
22  Wages stagnated at a time of economic euphoria in Mexico, with the new oil industry coming on stream at a time of 
particularly high oil prices. Th   is mania reached such heights that the previous President had declared at the end of his 
term in oﬃ   ce that from then on, ‘economic policy in Mexico was no longer an issue of allocation of scarce resources 
among multiple needs, but one of the distribution of abundance’. Th   is ‘abundance’ clearly did not reach wages!
Figure 18:
Mexico: average real wages and productivity, 1950-2000
1976 = 100 (3-year moving average) Constant 1980 prices
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Source: Palma (2005).
Notes: [P] = average productivity; and [W] 
= average real wages, salaries and employers’ 
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As Kalecki would have predicted, the two crises (1982 and 1994) also contributed to the new dis-
tributional environment, by drastically weakening the bargaining power of labour. However, as Prebisch and 
Singer would have predicted, as soon as manufacturing became export-oriented—particularly with capital 
increasingly mobile and labour relatively immobile—it began to behave as if it were a traditional primary 
commodity sector: wages immediately stagnated, and all productivity growth was either captured by capital 
or transferred to consumers in the North (in this case, to the US) via lower prices. In fact, wages were not able 
to grow in any signiﬁ  cant way even in the motorcar industry—which was the most successful activity within 
manufacturing during this period—despite a 330 per cent productivity growth (Palma, 2005). Mexico’s 
experience, in this respect, is certainly closer to the predictions of Prebisch and Singer than to those based on 
Samuelson’s theorem of trade-related wage equalization across the world.
Figure 19:
Mexico: wages and productivity 
in the manufacturing sector, 1950-1999
1976=100 (3-year moving average) Excludes 'maquila'












Mexico: wages and productivity 
in the non-tradable sector, 1950-1999
1976=100 (3-year moving average) Constant 1980 prices









Notes: [P] = average productivity; and [W] 
= average real wages, salaries and employers’ 
contributions.
Source: Palma (2005).
Notes: [P] = average productivity; and [W] 
= average real wages, salaries and employers’ 
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What about the relationship between wages and productivity in a sector unable to deliver productiv-
ity growth? Figure 20 indicates a similar gap between productivity growth and wage growth in non-tradables, 
but one moving in a diﬀ  erent direction—i.e., a similar ‘scissors’ pattern, but this time with a downward trend. 
Here, given productivity stagnation, wages had to fall substantially for the gap to emerge and for proﬁ  t mar-
gins to increase as in the rest of the economy.
Th   is decline in wages in non-tradable sectors (services, utilities and construction, accounting for 
about two-thirds of GDP) contrasts sharply with the situation before 1976, when there was another gap (then 
in favour of labour), with wages growing faster than productivity. Th   is was one characteristic of the previous 
‘corporatist’ structure of property rights in the labour market: wages in manufacturing (which grew at a rate 
roughly similar to productivity growth) set the pace for wage growth in the non-manufacturing sector of the 
economy, even in sectors where productivity growth was slower than in manufacturing. 
In this way, a new pattern of accumulation emerged with economic reform in Mexico (as in the rest 
of Latin America). If there is productivity growth, the new pattern is one of a shift towards a ‘winner takes 
all’ scenario (increasing proﬁ  t margins à la Prebisch-Singer); if there is none, capital can still increase its proﬁ  t 
margins, via the contraction of wages (à la Arthur Lewis, because institutional changes in the labour market 
allow capital to squeeze wages towards their subsistence level).23 In this way, even if productivity growth is dis-
appointing (mainly as a result of particularly poor investment eﬀ  ort), the stagnation of wages in some activi-
ties, and their decline in others, have proved to be an eﬀ  ective compensatory mechanism for capital to increase 
proﬁ  t margins in this era of globalization. 
Conclusions 
Although the (‘average’) Gini picture of the income distribution for diﬀ  erent regions of the world clearly 
shows four ‘layers’ of distribution across the world, this phenomenon only reﬂ  ects what happens to half 
the world’s population—those at the very top and those at the bottom of the distribution. Th  e  other 
half—in the middle and upper-middle deciles (5 to 9) of the distribution—oﬀ  ers a rather diﬀ  erent picture, 
of extraordinary homogeneity. Th   is is a truly remarkable fact that has not been properly emphasized in 
the literature so far. Clearly, more research is needed on the forces behind these opposite ‘centrifugal’ and 
‘centripetal’ movements.
Th   e similar income shares of the middle and upper-middle deciles across regions raise some doubts 
about distributional theories that give pride of place either to education or to trade-related wage diﬀ  erentials 
as the main determinants of income distribution. Groups with the highest degree of heterogeneity in distri-
butional terms are more likely to have higher degrees of homogeneity in educational terms, and vice versa. 
Looking at trade-related wage diﬀ  erentials, there does not seem to be much distributional variance in the 
middle part of the distribution where ‘skilled’ and ‘unskilled’ labour are most likely to be found. In general, 
political-institutional factors seem to have greater inﬂ  uence on the determination of income distribution than 
purely economic ones.24
23 Th   is ‘centrifugal’ force was so powerful that in real terms, if the level of the minimum wage is set at 100 in (the peak 
year of) 1976, by 1994, it had fallen to just one-third of that value, and by 2000, to a remarkable low of one-ﬁ  fth! See 
Palma (2005).
24 Th   is issue is discussed in more detail in the Latin American context in another paper (Palma, 2002a). See also Krug-
man and Lawrence (1993).Globalizing Inequality: ‘Centrifugal’ and ‘Centripetal’ Forces at Work  19
Th   e sample also shows a signiﬁ  cant distributional diﬀ  erence between English-speaking and non-
English-speaking OECD countries; the same phenomenon is found among the ex-communist countries (the 
diﬀ  erence between those countries that used to belong to the Soviet Union and those in Central, formerly 
Eastern, Europe).
Finally, in terms of the relationship between income distribution and income per capita in the era of 
globalization—and taking into account all the necessary econometric caveats on cross-sectional regressions of 
this nature, problems with the quality of the data, and the fact that, in many countries (especially in Sub-Sa-
haran Africa), the data refer to expenditure, not income—the relevant regressions seem to support the follow-
ing three hypotheses:
ﬁ  rst, statistically, the ‘inverted U’ and ‘U’ cross-section relationship still applies in the case of the 
distributional diversity at the very top and at the bottom of the income distribution; 
second (and in analytical terms, far more important), within these relationships, (much more 
homogeneous) regional eﬀ  ects clearly dominate; and 
third, Latin America has, so far, had the largest ‘excess’ inequality of any region in the world vis-à-
vis its income per capita.
In fact, Latin America seems to be in a distributional league of its own.25 While political oligarchies 
all over the Th   ird World would be very happy to appropriate such high shares of national income, the ques-
tion remains why only in Latin America they manage to get away with it!
25  Brazil, Chile or Mexico may be characterized as middle-income countries, but the top 10 per cent are able to live the 
equivalent of a modern European lifestyle, thanks mainly to the fact that the bottom 40 per cent are still living the 
equivalent of a medieval European lifestyle.
•
•
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Appendix 1
LA (Latin America) = Bolivia, Brazil, Chile, Colombia, Costa Rica, Dominican Republic, Ecuador, El 
Salvador, Guatemala, Honduras, Mexico, Nicaragua, Panama, Paraguay, Peru, Uruguay and Venezuela. 
AF (Sub-Saharan Africa) = Burkina Faso, Burundi, Cote d’Ivoire, Th   e Gambia, Ghana, Guinea, Guinea-
Bissau, Kenya, Lesotho, Madagascar, Mali, Mauritania, Mozambique, Niger, Nigeria, Rwanda, Senegal, 
South Africa, Swaziland, Tanzania, Uganda, Zambia and Zimbabwe.
EA1 (‘ﬁ  rst-tier’ NICs) = Th   e Republic of Korea.a
EA2 (‘second-tier’ NICs) = Malaysia, Philippines and Th  ailand. 
SA (large South Asia and low-income Southeast Asia) = Bangladesh, China, India, Indonesia, Lao PDR, 
Pakistan, Sri Lanka and Viet Nam. 
NA (North Africa) = Algeria, Egypt, Jordan, Morocco and Tunisia. 
CA (Caribbean countries) = Guyana, Jamaica, St. Lucia and Trinidad and Tobago. 
OECD1 (non-English-speaking OECD) = Austria, Belgium, Denmark, Finland, France, Germany, 
Greece, Italy, Japan, Luxembourg, Netherlands, Norway, Portugal, Spain and Sweden. 
OECD2 (English-speaking OECD) = Australia, Canada, Ireland, New Zealand, United Kingdom and 
United States. 
Ex-C1 (ex-communist countries of Central Europe) = Bulgaria, Croatia, Czech Republic, Hungary, 
Poland, Romania, Slovak Republic and Slovenia. 
Ex-C2 (ex-communist countries of the former Soviet Union) = Belarus, Estonia, Kazakhstan, Kyrgyz 
Republic, Latvia, Lithuania, Moldova, Russian Federation, Turkmenistan, Ukraine and Uzbekistan. 




Reg. d10 Reg. d1-d4 Reg. d10/d1
Intersect 2.0484 4.8866 -0.6353
Ln Y pc 0.4222 -0.5541 0.9062
Ln Y pc sq -0.0288 0.0354 -0.0610
LA dummy 0.2462 -0.3118 1.2329
AF dummy 0.1016 -0.2317 0.3822
SA dummy -0.0196 0.0286 -0.0846
NA dummy -0.1717 0.1963 -0.4801
OECD1 dummy -0.0013 0.0019 -0.0041
Notes: Th  e  ﬁ  rst regression corresponds to ﬁ  gure 13; the second, to ﬁ  gure 14; and the third, to ﬁ  gure 15. Ln Y pc = log of income per 
capita; Ln Y pc sq = square of the log of income per capita; for dummy speciﬁ  cations, see ﬁ  gure 13.
a  As mentioned above, in graphs where regional averages are shown, data from Hong Kong SAR and Taiwan Province of 
China were added to that for South Korea to form an enlarged EA1. However, these two countries are not included in 
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‘t’ values
Reg. d10 Reg.  d1-d4 Reg. d10/d1
Intersect 5.05 7.95 -0.46
Ln Y pc 3.74 -3.50 2.48
Ln Y pc sq -3.99 3.61 -2.63
LA dummy 5.17 -4.87 7.45
AF dummy 2.07 -2.89 2.22
SA dummy -2.02 3.37 -4.73
NA dummy -2.45 2.97 -2.98
OECD1 dummy -2.32 3.92 -3.22
Notes: ‘t’ statistics (and the ‘p’ values below) are based on ‘White’s heteroscedasticity adjusted standard errors’. Ln Y pc = log of 
income per capita; Ln Y pc sq = square of the log of income per capita; for dummy speciﬁ  cations, see ﬁ  gure 13.
‘p’ values
Reg. d10 Reg. d1-d4 Reg. d10/d1
Intersect 0.000 0.000 0.650
Ln Y pc 0.000 0.001 0.015
Ln Y pc sq 0.000 0.001 0.010
LA dummy 0.000 0.000 0.000
AF dummy 0.042 0.005 0.029
SA dummy 0.047 0.001 0.000
NA dummy 0.016 0.004 0.004
OECD1 dummy 0.022 0.000 0.002
Notes: ‘t’ statistics (and the ‘p’ values below) are based on ‘White’s heteroscedasticity adjusted standard errors’. Ln Y pc = log of 
income per capita; Ln Y pc sq = square of the log of income per capita; for dummy speciﬁ  cations, see ﬁ  gure 13.
Regression statistics
Reg. d10 Reg. d1-d4 Reg. d10/d1
R-bar-sq 0.74 0.64 0.71
se y 0.13 0.19 0.47
F 32.7 20.5 28.2
‘p’ of F 0.000 0.000 0.000
Notes: R-bar-sq is the adjusted coeﬃ   cient of determination; se y = the standard error for the ‘y’ estimate; F = the F statistic; and ‘p’ of 
F = the ‘p’ value of F.